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PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 11-3148 
_____________ 
 
ROBERT A. MARIOTTI, SR., 
                                   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
MARIOTTI BUILDING PRODUCTS, INC. 
_____________ 
        
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
District Court  No. 3-11-cv-00737 
District Judge: The Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
March 18, 2013 
 
Before: SMITH, GREENAWAY, JR., and VAN 
ANTWERPEN,  
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 29, 2013) 
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OPINION 
_____________________  
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
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 In Clackamas Gastroenterology Associates, P.C. v. 
Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003), the Supreme Court set out a test 
for determining whether a shareholder-director of a 
professional corporation is an “employee” for purposes of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).  Id. at 449-50.  This 
appeal allows us to consider whether that test applies to 
business entities that are not professional corporations in a 
Title VII employment action.  We hold that it does.   
I. 
Mariotti Building Products, Inc., is a “closely held 
family business.”  Louis S. “Babe” Mariotti started the family 
business in 1947, operating “a small lumber yard.”  In the 
1960s, Babe‟s sons, Plaintiff Robert A. Mariotti, Sr. 
(Plaintiff), and his two brothers, Eugene L. Mariotti, Sr. and 
Louis C. Mariotti “joined the business.”  Babe and his sons 
continued to develop the business, eventually incorporating it 
as Mariotti Building Products, Inc. (MBP).  The business 
“experienced substantial growth” over the years with “annual 
sales skyrocketing from less than $250,000 to over $60 
Million.”  MBP, according to the amended complaint, is 
“recognized as the area‟s best source for building 
materials[.]”  Plaintiff averred that he was “responsible for 
developing and growing a number of areas” of MBP‟s 
business, “principally manag[ing] the manufactured housing 
sales division of the company together with customer credit, 
bill paying, and purchasing and inbound transportation of 
product lines[.]”  Plaintiff further averred that the divisions he 
managed “earned profit” of more than $15 million in the six 
years preceding termination of his employment, and that that 
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amount exceeded the profit of the divisions managed by his 
brother Eugene.   
As “one of the founders of MBP,” Plaintiff was an 
officer of the corporation, serving as both vice-president and 
secretary.  He also served as a member of the board of 
directors, and was a shareholder pursuant to a written 
agreement executed by the parties on July 23, 2007.  Plaintiff 
averred that he and his brothers “were not at-will employees” 
of MBP because they were employed pursuant to an 
agreement that provided for termination “only for cause.”   
Plaintiff alleged that he had a “spiritual awakening” in 
1995.  His newfound spirituality, he claimed, resulted in “a 
systematic pattern of antagonism” toward him.  It took the 
form of “negative, hostile and/or humiliating statements” 
about him and his religious affiliation.  MBP‟s officers, 
directors, and some employees were the source of this 
harassment.  In 2005, the harassment increased.   
Babe Mariotti, the family patriarch, died either at the 
end of 2008 or in the first days of January 2009.  On January 
4, 2009, while the family was making arrangements for the 
funeral, Eugene Mariotti, derided Plaintiff and his faith.  At 
the funeral on January 6, Plaintiff delivered a eulogy, which 
included comments about his own faith, and his “father‟s 
good example.”  The eulogy upset members of the family.  
On January 8, the shareholders of the closely held family 
business convened a meeting in Plaintiff‟s absence and 
decided to terminate his employment.   
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Two days later on January 10, 2009, Plaintiff received 
written notice of the termination of his employment.  The 
notice recited that the shareholders had met to discuss his 
future status as an employee and that the vote to terminate his 
employment had been unanimous and was effective 
immediately.  The letter explained that various benefits would 
cease, including the use of a company car, health insurance 
coverage, a cellular telephone, access to company credit 
cards, and the availability of an office.  Finally, the letter 
explained that “[y]our share of any draws from the 
corporation or other entities will continue to be distributed to 
you.”1   
 Despite his termination in January of 2009, Plaintiff 
continued to serve as a member of MBP‟s board of directors 
“until August 6, 2009, when the shareholders did not re-elect 
him as a director” of the closely held family corporation.  On 
October 22, 2009, Plaintiff filed a timely charge of religious 
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, as amended.  42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).  Thereafter, 
Plaintiff filed suit against MBP, asserting Title VII claims of 
religious discrimination and a hostile work environment.  He 
also asserted several state law claims.  MBP moved to dismiss 
the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), 
arguing that Plaintiff was not an “employee” for purposes of 
Title VII and could not invoke its protections.  An amended 
                                                 
1
 In a closely held corporation, a “draw” is a withdrawal of 
money from the business to the business owner.  The 
American Heritage Dictionary of Business Terms (2010), 
available at http://business.yourdictionary.com/draw. 
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complaint followed, and was met with a second motion to 
dismiss asserting the same argument. 
 In a Memorandum dated July 8, 2011, the District 
Court granted the motion to dismiss the Title VII claims and 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state 
law claims.  The Court concluded that Plaintiff was “not an 
„employee‟ under Title VII.”  Mariotti v. Mariotti Bldg. 
Prods., Inc., No. 3:11-CV-737, 2011 WL 2670570, at *4 
(M.D. Pa. July 8, 2011).  Alternatively, the Court determined 
that “[e]ven if [Plaintiff] was an employee under Title VII, he 
has failed to state a hostile work environment claim.”  Id.  A 
timely notice of appeal followed.
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II. 
 Under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to dismiss may be 
granted only if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiff, a court concludes that “the 
allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a 
claim of entitlement to relief[.]”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 558 (2007).  We exercise plenary review over 
an order granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.  W. Penn Allegheny 
Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 97 (3d Cir. 2010).  
Whether the District Court applied the correct legal standard 
in deciding that Plaintiff was not an employee for purposes of 
Title VII presents a legal question.  Accordingly, we exercise 
                                                 
2
 The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1367.  We have appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291. 
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plenary review.  Lanning v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 181 F.3d 
478, 484-85 (3d Cir. 1999).   
III. 
In Clackamas, the Supreme Court considered whether 
the shareholder-directors of a professional corporation should 
be counted as employees in determining whether the business 
entity met the threshold number of employees, and thereby 
qualified as an employer under the ADA.  538 U.S. at 442.  
Noting that the ADA purported to define the term 
“employee,” the Court began its analysis by declaring that the 
statute “simply states that an „employee‟ is „an individual 
employed by an employer.‟”  Id. at 444 (quoting 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12111(4)).  This definition, in the Court‟s view, “surely 
qualifies as a mere „nominal definition‟ that is „completely 
circular and explains nothing.‟”3  Id. (quoting Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992)).  
Consistent with precedent, the Supreme Court looked to the 
“„conventional master-servant relationship as understood by 
common-law agency doctrine‟” in deciding what Congress 
intended the term “employee” to mean.  Id. at 445 (quoting 
Darden, 503 U.S. at 322-23). 
 The Court observed that “the common law‟s definition 
of the master-servant relationship,” focusing as it does on the 
“master‟s control over the servant,” provided “helpful 
guidance.”  Id. at 448.  It concluded that “the common-law 
element of control is the principal guidepost that should be 
followed” in deciding whether an individual is an employee.  
                                                 
3
 We would go so far as to characterize it as tautological. 
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Id.  After considering the guidelines of the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) applicable to 
determining whether “partners, officers, members of boards 
of directors, and major shareholders qualify as employees[,]” 
id., the Court declared that six factors in the EEOC guidelines 
were “relevant to the inquiry whether a shareholder-director 
is an employee,” id. at 449.  The six EEOC factors identified 
by the Court were: 
[1.]  Whether the organization can hire or fire 
the individual or set the rules and regulations of 
the individual‟s work 
[2.] Whether and, if so, to what extent the 
organization supervises the individual‟s work 
[3.] Whether the individual reports to 
someone higher in the organization 
[4.] Whether and, if so, to what extent the 
individual is able to influence the organization 
[5.] Whether the parties intended that the 
individual be an employee, as expressed in 
written agreements or contracts 
[6.] Whether the individual shares in the 
profits, losses, and liabilities of the 
organization. 
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Id. at 449-50 (quoting EEOC Compl. Man. § 605:0009 
(2000)).   
 The Supreme Court instructed that “[a]s the EEOC‟s 
standard reflects, an employer is the person, or group of 
persons, who owns and manages the enterprise.”  Id. at 450.  
The Court cautioned against using an individual‟s title as the 
determinative factor and noted that the mere existence of an 
employment agreement is likewise not dispositive.  Id.  
Rather, “the answer to whether a shareholder-director is an 
employee depends on all the incidents of the relationship . . . 
with no one factor being decisive.”  Id. at 451 (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 Plaintiff contends that Clackamas should not be 
applied in this case.  He is correct that there are several 
differences between Clackamas and this case.  None of those 
differences, however, provides a sound basis for disregarding 
the Supreme Court‟s guidance in Clackamas.   
 First, Plaintiff argues Clackamas concerned the ADA, 
not Title VII.  This distinction is without significance.  The 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Clackamas to address the 
conflict among the courts in determining whether an 
individual qualifies as an employee under the ADA, as well 
as under other antidiscrimination statutes, including Title VII 
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).  
538 U.S. at 444 n.3.  Because Title VII‟s definition of 
employee is the same as the ADA‟s definition, see 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e(f), 12111(4), and because the EEOC‟s guidelines, 
on which the Clackamas Court relied, apply to coverage 
under Title VII, the ADEA, the ADA, and the Equal Pay Act, 
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see Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 449 n.7, we conclude that the 
analysis set out in Clackamas applies to Title VII as well.  See 
De Jesus v. LTT Card Servs., Inc., 474 F.3d 16, 24 (1st Cir. 
2007).  
 Second, we recognize that Clackamas concerned 
whether an individual was an employee for purposes of 
determining if the employee threshold had been met, thereby 
subjecting the business entity to the ADA‟s prohibitions 
against discrimination.  538 U.S. at 442.  As Plaintiff 
correctly notes, there is no dispute in this case that MBP, 
which has more than 15 employees, qualifies as an employer 
covered by Title VII.  Nonetheless, Clackamas remains 
applicable here because neither the ADA nor Title VII define 
the term “employee” solely for purposes of deciding which 
business entities may be subject to the proscriptions against 
employment discrimination.
4
  Rather, the definitions in the 
ADA and Title VII also apply to the statutory provisions 
establishing enforcement mechanisms that may be exercised 
by the EEOC or the aggrieved employee.  42 U.S.C. 
§§ 2000e-5, 12117.  Thus, the definitions of “employer” and 
“employee” set forth in both the ADA and Title VII are 
relevant in resolving (1) whether an entity qualifies as an 
“employer” under Title VII, and (2) whether an individual is 
                                                 
4
 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (providing that the definitions are for 
the purposes of “this subchapter,” which is Subchapter VI, 
regarding equal employment opportunities); see also 42 
U.S.C. § 12111 (specifying that its definitions are for 
purposes of Subchapter I of the ADA pertaining to 
employment). 
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an “employee” who “may invoke [Title VII‟s] . . . protections 
against discrimination[.]”  Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 446 n.6.  
As a consequence, even though Clackamas considered the 
question of whether certain individuals were employees of a 
covered entity, its test informs our determination as to 
whether Plaintiff is entitled to invoke Title VII‟s protections.   
 Third, we consider Plaintiff‟s contention that the 
Clackamas test applies only to professional corporations.  
Because MBP is not a professional corporation, Plaintiff 
asserts that the District Court erred by applying the 
Clackamas test.  
 We are not persuaded.  As the First Circuit noted in De 
Jesus, the EEOC Compliance Manual, on which the 
Clackamas Court relied, did “not restrict itself to professional 
corporations; indeed, it explicitly covers major shareholders.”  
474 F.3d at 24.  For that reason, the First Circuit concluded 
that Clackamas “applies to close corporations as well as to 
professional corporations.”  Id.  Similarly, in Smith v. 
Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971 (7th Cir. 2006), the 
Seventh Circuit reiterated “that the Clackamas test is not 
confined to shareholder-directors” of a professional 
corporation, but “may be applied” to other business entities as 
envisioned by the EEOC manual that the Court embraced.  Id. 
at 977 (citing Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 633 (7th Cir. 
2005)).  The Court proceeded to apply Clackamas in deciding 
whether the sole proprietor‟s mother and husband, both of 
whom managed the business, qualified as employees, thereby 
subjecting the diner to Title VII coverage.  
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 We agree with our sister Courts of Appeals that 
Clackamas‟s application is not limited to professional 
corporations.  The EEOC Manual on which the Court relied 
in Clackamas considered multiple business enterprises.  538 
U.S at 449.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court‟s analysis 
pointed out that the form of the business entity was not the 
key element, emphasizing that the determination of one‟s 
status cannot be decided simply on the basis of titles, such as 
an individual‟s status as a partner, director, or officer, or the 
existence of documentary evidence.  Id. at 449-450.  “Rather, 
. . . the answer to whether [an individual] is an employee 
depends on all of the incidents of the relationship with no one 
factor being decisive.”  Id. at 451 (internal quotation marks, 
ellipsis and citations omitted).  We therefore conclude that the 
nature of the business entity is simply an attribute of the 
employment relationship that must be considered in applying 
the Clackamas test to determine whether an individual is an 
employee or an employer.  For that reason, MBP‟s status as a 
closely held family business informs our analysis.   
Consistent with Clackamas, our analysis focuses on 
the element of control and the six factors discussed in that 
precedent.  538 U.S. at 448-50.  As the Seventh Circuit 
explained in Castaways Family Diner, the six factors address 
not only the extent of an individual‟s control, but also “the 
source of an individual‟s authority” to control. 453 F.3d at 
983.  Castaways Family Diner recognized that in Clackamas 
the Supreme Court did not mention the source of an 
individual‟s authority as a factor in the analysis.  Id. at 984.  
Nonetheless, the Seventh Circuit believed that the Supreme 
Court “hinted” as much “in at least one of the test‟s six 
factors,” i.e. the factor regarding “„[w]hether the organization 
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can hire or fire the individual or set the rules and regulations 
of the individual‟s work.‟”  Id. (quoting Clackamas, 538 U.S. 
at 449 (emphasis added)).  It further noted that the  
significance of the source of an individual‟s 
authority is implicit in the framing of the test as 
one for partners, major shareholders, directors, 
and the like. . . . [as] those are the types of 
individuals whose status within an enterprise 
potentially gives them authority that is not 
dependent on the acquiescence of others.  
Clackamas itself speaks not only of the control 
that an employer exercises but his right to exert 
such control. 
Id. at 984-85 (citing Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 448).  We agree 
with the Seventh Circuit.  As additional support for our view, 
we note that the fourth factor set forth in Clackamas, which 
scrutinizes the individual‟s ability to “influence the 
organization,” implicitly examines the source of the 
individual‟s authority.  Clackamas, 538 U.S. at 450. 
Accordingly, we adopt the approach of the Seventh 
Circuit in Castaways Family Diner.  In determining whether 
Plaintiff‟s amended complaint states a claim for relief under 
Title VII, we “must take into account not only the authority 
[he] wields within the enterprise but also the source of that 
authority.”  Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d at 984.  
Specifically, we must consider whether Plaintiff “exercises 
the authority by right, or whether he exercises it by delegation 
at the pleasure of others who ultimately do possess the right 
to control the enterprise.”  Id.  
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 Our review of the allegations of Plaintiff‟s amended 
complaint confirms that Plaintiff‟s status as a shareholder, a 
director, and a corporate officer gave him both substantial 
authority at MBP and the right to control the enterprise.  He 
was entitled to participate in the management, development, 
and governance of MBP.  By sitting on the board of directors 
and serving as a corporate officer, Plaintiff had the ability to 
participate in the fundamental decisions of the business.  We 
cannot ignore Plaintiff‟s allegation, which we must accept as 
true, that after his termination in January of 2009, he 
continued to serve as a director of the closely held family 
corporation until August 6, 2009.  Furthermore, the 
termination letter he received did not mention the cessation of 
any salary.  Instead, it stated that “[y]our shares of any draws 
from the corporation or other entities will continue to be 
distributed to you.”  We conclude that Plaintiff‟s amended 
complaint fails to allege that he is “the kind of person that the 
common law would consider” an employee.  Clackamas, 538 
U.S. at 445 n.5.  He has not alleged a claim that entitles him 
to relief.
5
 
                                                 
5
 The Clackamas test is a fact intensive one; therefore, cases 
requiring application of the test may generally require 
resolution at the summary judgment stage, rather than at the 
motion to dismiss stage.  See Decotiis v. Whittemore, 635 
F.3d 22, 35 n.15 (1st Cir. 2011) (noting in other context that 
courts hesitate to dispose of fact-intensive inquiry at motion 
to dismiss stage); Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199-
200 (2d Cir. 2001) (same).  Similarly, we note that most of 
the decisions of our sister Courts of Appeals, in applying the 
Clackamas factors, dealt with motions for summary 
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 We recognize that Plaintiff‟s amended complaint 
alleges that he did not have exclusive control of MBP.  
Exclusive control, however, is merely one attribute of the 
employment relationship.  Its absence does not compel a 
conclusion that an individual who lacks it is an employee 
entitled to invoke Title VII‟s protections.  Such a conclusion 
would ignore that the EEOC guidelines, which the Court 
embraced in Clackamas, pertained to business entities that do 
not vest exclusive control in any one individual.  Id. at 448 
(noting the guidelines applied to “partners, officers, members 
of boards of directors, and major shareholders” (emphasis 
added))  
The allegations in the amended complaint make plain 
that Plaintiff was entitled to participate in the development 
                                                                                                             
judgment, rather than motions to dismiss.  E.g., Fichman v. 
Media Ctr., 512 F.3d 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2008); De Jesus v. 
LTT Card Servs., Inc., 474 F.3d 16, 18 (1st Cir. 2007); Smith 
v. Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d 971, 972 (7th Cir. 
2006); Solon v. Kaplan, 398 F.3d 629, 630 (7th Cir. 2005).  
Clackamas itself was an appeal from a grant of summary 
judgment.  538 U.S. at 442.   
The fact that we are affirming the District Court‟s 
dismissal of the complaint based on application of the 
Clackamas test does not alter the fact-intensive nature of the 
analysis nor does it indicate that the motion to dismiss stage 
will usually be the appropriate juncture for application of the 
test.  Rather, on the clear facts and circumstances of this 
specific case, we find that the District Court‟s determination 
was the proper one.   
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and governance of the business  His averment that he 
continued to serve after his termination on January 9, 2009 as 
a member of the board of directors confirms that he remained 
entitled by virtue of his position “to a say in the fundamental 
decisions” of the closely held family corporation for months 
after his termination.  Castaways Family Diner, 453 F.3d at 
983.  For that reason, we conclude that the District Court did 
not err in its determination that the allegations in Plaintiff‟s 
complaint did not establish that he was an employee under 
Title VII.  He is not entitled, therefore, to invoke its 
protections. 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court.
6
   
 
                                                 
6
 Because we conclude that Plaintiff is not entitled to invoke 
the protections of Title VII, there is no need to consider 
whether his amended complaint sufficiently alleged a hostile 
environment claim. 
